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DUI-101

RETROGRADE EXTRAPOLATION (looking back in time)

At the time of driving! The state must prove your blood alcohol content at the time you were driving. Your breath reading an hour or two later is not what proves you guilty of DUI. Your breath reading at the time you were driving is what is important. You breath reading at the time you were driving had a lot to do with how much you weigh. Your metabolism. What you ate. How much you ate? When you ate? What you drank, how much you drank, when you started and when you stopped drinking.

In order for the state attorney to prove that you were over the .08 legal limit at the time you were driving the State Attorney would have to “extrapolate”, that is estimate what your breath alcohol reading was at the time you were first stopped.

NON COMPLIANCE WITH FDLE RULES

The Florida Department of Law Enforcement promulgates certain rules that law enforcement must follow before and after administering a breath test. If Law Enforcement fails to follow any of these rules then an attorney can file a motion to suppress the breath reading based on non compliance with FDLE rules.

THE CONFUSION DOCTRINE

If an officers mixes up the order in which he reads Miranda and Implied consent you may win a motion to suppress.

What is Miranda? The US and Florida Constitutions tell us that a person has the absolute constitutional right to remain silent and not incriminate himself. That is a person does not have to say or do anything that may implicate him in a crime. A police officer must read you’re your Miranda rights by way of a form in every DUI. If a person chooses to exercise this constitutional right to remain silent, his/her failure to cooperate, or silence cannot be used against them. This is called exercising your “Miranda” rights.

What is implied consent? Implied consent is a document a police officer must read to a person before administering the breath test. Implied consent instructs an arrested person that if she or he fails to blow, they will loose their license for a year and the refusal to blow can be used against them in court. Sometimes in a DUI a police officer may read a person their “Miranda Rights,” before “implied consent.” If this happens an attorney can file a motion to suppress for violating the confusion doctrine.

VIOLATION OF THE TWENTY MINUTE OBSERVATION PERIOD

FDLE rules require that an officer observe you for twenty minutes prior to administering a breath test. The reason behind this rule is to ensure that the arrestee does not regurgitate, throw up, burp, or have anything in his mouth or throat prior to administering the breath test. Anything in a persons mouth immediately prior to a breath test can cause a false reading. For example if a person takes a swig of vodka, does not swallow and just spits it out. The breathalyzer may give a false high reading for up to 20 minutes. This is called mouth alcohol. Although the machine has a mouth alcohol detector 50% of the time the machine will give a false breath reading.

If the officer failed to observe you for those 20 minutes prior to the testing your breath can be suppressed. For example many officers like to count the time they took to transport you to the station as part of the 20 minutes. This is unacceptable and it happens quite frequently.. If this happened in your case you have a motion!

ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONROL

You may have an APC MOTION. The state must prove you were in actual physical control. In other words they government must show that you were driving. Did you have an accident? If you were not inside your vehicle when the police arrived it may be impossible for the state to prove you were driving. Sure you know you were driving, and so does everyone else but that doesn’t mean they can prove it or even mention it unless the officer saw you driving. Maybe the civilian witnesses who you had the accident saw you driving. Many times the state cannot procure the attendance of these winesses and half of the ones that show cannot remember the face of the person they had the accident with.

MOTION TO EXCLUDE HGN or CROPPER MOTION

One of the road tests the officer administered to you before you were arrested was the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (H.G.N.) Florida Law requires that “There must be a confirmatory blood, breath, or urine test before H.G.N. evidence is admissible.” Cropper v. State, 11th Judicial Circuit, Case # 98-436 AC, Lower Case # 431701 X, Opinion filed February 29, 2000, citing Bowen v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2709 (Fla. 3d DCA December 8, 1999); Faries v. State, 711 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).

What that means is if you didn’t blow, the HGN test the officer gave you at the side of the road is inadmissible in court.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE BLOOD DRAW

Florida law and the US constitution prohibit the police from taking your blood for a DUI investigation unless there has been a death or serious bodily injury. Florida law reads:

“...if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in the actual physical control of a person under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substances has caused the death or serious bodily injury of a human being, such person shall submit, upon request of a law enforcement officer, to a test of the person’s blood...

If the State cannot show that there was probable cause that there was a death or serious bodily injury the blood draw is inadmissible.

BEJA MOTON/OR STOP MOTON

Before an officer can stop an individual he must have "founded" or reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. Fla. Stat. 901.151(2). A "mere" or bare suspicion will not suffice. State v. Beja, 451 So.2d 882 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). In order to stop an automobile and to request ID from its occupants, it is required that the officer have a founded or reasonable suspicion which requires further investigation. Lewis v. State, 337 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976). Also see; James v. State, 556 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), Cooper v. State, 584 So.2d 1124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), Callahan v. State, 671 So.2d 227 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), Cox v. State, 586 So.2d 1321 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1991), Davis v. State, 606 So.2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Any evidence obtained by virtue of an illegal seizure in violation of Florida Statute 901.151(2) and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment's rights under the United States Constitution, should be suppressed as "fruits of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, (1963).


PENALTIES AND SENTENCE

Florida Statute 316.193 Outlines the penalties for DUI.

If you plead Guilty the penalties for a first DUI are:
1. A maximum of 180 days in the Dade County jail
2. At least a 6 month Drivers License Suspension.
3. A $250 to $500 fine
4. One year criminal probation
5. DUI school
6. Victim Impact Class
7. At least 50 Community service Hours.

8. Vehicle impoundment for 10 days
9. Court costs
10. If your blood alcohol level or breath alcohol level is .2 or higher or you were accompanied in the vehicle by someone under 18 years of age;
A. Not more than 270 days in jail
B. Your fine will be not less $500 or more than $1000
C. The court shall order at your expense, an Ignition Interlock Device for up to 180 days

11. Permanent DUI conviction on your record for life
12. Insurance costs will skyrocket if they don't drop you

316.193 Driving under the influence; penalties.--

(1) A person is guilty of the offense of driving under the influence and is subject to punishment as provided in subsection (2) if the person is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state and:

a. The person is under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance controlled under chapter 893, when affected to the extent that the person's normal faculties are impaired;
b. The person has a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood; or
c. The person has a breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.

(2)

a. Except as provided in paragraph
b. subsection

(3), or subsection

(4), any person who is convicted of a violation of subsection

(1) shall be punished:
1. By a fine of:
a. Not less than $250 or more than $500 for a first conviction.
b. Not less than $500 or more than $1,000 for a second conviction; and

2. By imprisonment for:
a. Not more than 6 months for a first conviction.
b. Not more than 9 months for a second conviction.

3. For a second conviction, by mandatory placement for a period of at least 1 year, at the convicted person's sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license. The installation of such device may not occur before July 1, 2003.

(b)1. Any person who is convicted of a third violation of this section for an offense that occurs within 10 years after a prior conviction for a violation of this section commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. In addition, the court shall order the mandatory placement for a period of not less than 2 years, at the convicted person's sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license. The installation of such device may not occur before July 1, 2003.

2. Any person who is convicted of a third violation of this section for an offense that occurs more than 10 years after the date of a prior conviction for a violation of this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than $1,000 or more than $2,500 and by imprisonment for not more than 12 months. In addition, the court shall order the mandatory placement for a period of at least 2 years, at the convicted person's sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license. The installation of such device may not occur before July 1, 2003.

3. Any person who is convicted of a fourth or subsequent violation of this section, regardless of when any prior conviction for a violation of this section occurred, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. However, the fine imposed for such fourth or subsequent violation may be not less than $1,000.

1(3) Any person:
(a) Who is in violation of subsection (1);
(b) Who operates a vehicle; and
(c) Who, by reason of such operation, causes or contributes to causing:

1. Damage to the property or person of another commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

2. Serious bodily injury to another, as defined in s. 316.1933, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

3. The death of any human being or unborn quick child commits DUI manslaughter, and commits:

a. A felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

b. A felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if:

(I) At the time of the crash, the person knew, or should have known, that the crash occurred; and

(II) The person failed to give information and render aid as required by s. 316.062.

For purposes of this subsection, the definition of the term "unborn quick child" shall be determined in accordance with the definition of viable fetus as set forth in s. 782.071.

(4) Any person who is convicted of a violation of subsection (1) and who has a blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.20 or higher, or any person who is convicted of a violation of subsection (1) and who at the time of the offense was accompanied in the vehicle by a person under the age of 18 years, shall be punished:

(a) By a fine of:
1. Not less than $500 or more than $1,000 for a first conviction.
2. Not less than $1,000 or more than $2,000 for a second conviction.
3. Not less than $2,000 for a third or subsequent conviction.

(b) By imprisonment for:
1. Not more than 9 months for a first conviction.
2. Not more than 12 months for a second conviction.

For the purposes of this subsection, only the instant offense is required to be a violation of subsection

(1) by a person who has a blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.20 or higher.

(c) In addition to the penalties in paragraphs

(a) and

(b), the court shall order the mandatory placement, at the convicted person's sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person for up to 6 months for the first offense and for at least 2 years for a second offense, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license. The installation of such device may not occur before July 1, 2003.


(5) The court shall place all offenders convicted of violating this section on monthly reporting probation and shall require completion of a substance abuse course conducted by a DUI program licensed by the department under s. 322.292, which must include a psychosocial evaluation of the offender. If the DUI program refers the offender to an authorized substance abuse treatment provider for substance abuse treatment, in addition to any sentence or fine imposed under this section, completion of all such education, evaluation, and treatment is a condition of reporting probation.

The offender shall assume reasonable costs for such education, evaluation, and treatment. The referral to treatment resulting from a psychosocial evaluation shall not be waived without a supporting independent psychosocial evaluation conducted by an authorized substance abuse treatment provider appointed by the court, which shall have access to the DUI program's psychosocial evaluation before the independent psychosocial evaluation is conducted. The court shall review the results and recommendations of both evaluations before determining the request for waiver. The offender shall bear the full cost of this procedure. The term "substance abuse" means the abuse of alcohol or any substance named or described in Schedules I through V of s. 893.03.

If an offender referred to treatment under this subsection fails to report for or complete such treatment or fails to complete the DUI program substance abuse education course and evaluation, the DUI program shall notify the court and the department of the failure. Upon receipt of the notice, the department shall cancel the offender's driving privilege, notwithstanding the terms of the court order or any suspension or revocation of the driving privilege. The department may temporarily reinstate the driving privilege on a restricted basis upon verification from the DUI program that the offender is currently participating in treatment and the DUI education course and evaluation requirement has been completed.

If the DUI program notifies the department of the second failure to complete treatment, the department shall reinstate the driving privilege only after notice of completion of treatment from the DUI program. The organization that conducts the substance abuse education and evaluation may not provide required substance abuse treatment unless a waiver has been granted to that organization by the department. A waiver may be granted only if the department determines, in accordance with its rules, that the service provider that conducts the substance abuse education and evaluation is the most appropriate service provider and is licensed under chapter 397 or is exempt from such licensure.

A statistical referral report shall be submitted quarterly to the department by each organization authorized to provide services under this section.

(6) With respect to any person convicted of a violation of subsection (1), regardless of any penalty imposed pursuant to subsection (2), subsection (3), or subsection

(4):

(a) For the first conviction, the court shall place the defendant on probation for a period not to exceed 1 year and, as a condition of such probation, shall order the defendant to participate in public service or a community work project for a minimum of 50 hours; or the court may order instead, that any defendant pay an additional fine of $10 for each hour of public service or community work otherwise required, if, after consideration of the residence or location of the defendant at the time public service or community work is required, payment of the fine is in the best interests of the state. However, the total period of probation and incarceration may not exceed 1 year.

The court must also, as a condition of probation, order the impoundment or immobilization of the vehicle that was operated by or in the actual control of the defendant or any one vehicle registered in the defendant's name at the time of impoundment or immobilization, for a period of 10 days or for the unexpired term of any lease or rental agreement that expires within 10 days. The impoundment or immobilization must not occur concurrently with the incarceration of the defendant. The impoundment or immobilization order may be dismissed in accordance with paragraph (e), paragraph (f), paragraph (g), or paragraph (h).

(b) For the second conviction for an offense that occurs within a period of 5 years after the date of a prior conviction for violation of this section, the court shall order imprisonment for not less than 10 days. The court must also, as a condition of probation, order the impoundment or immobilization of all vehicles owned by the defendant at the time of impoundment or immobilization, for a period of 30 days or for the unexpired term of any lease or rental agreement that expires within 30 days. The impoundment or immobilization must not occur concurrently with the incarceration of the defendant and must occur concurrently with the driver's license revocation imposed under s. 322.28(2)(a)2. The impoundment or immobilization order may be dismissed in accordance with paragraph (e), paragraph (f), paragraph (g), or paragraph (h). At least 48 hours of confinement must be consecutive.

(c) For the third or subsequent conviction for an offense that occurs within a period of 10 years after the date of a prior conviction for violation of this section, the court shall order imprisonment for not less than 30 days. The court must also, as a condition of probation, order the impoundment or immobilization of all vehicles owned by the defendant at the time of impoundment or immobilization, for a period of 90 days or for the unexpired term of any lease or rental agreement that expires within 90 days. The impoundment or immobilization must not occur concurrently with the incarceration of the defendant and must occur concurrently with the driver's license revocation imposed under s. 322.28(2)(a)3. The impoundment or immobilization order may be dismissed in accordance with paragraph (e), paragraph (f), paragraph (g), or paragraph (h). At least 48 hours of confinement must be consecutive.

(d) The court must at the time of sentencing the defendant issue an order for the impoundment or immobilization of a vehicle. Within 7 business days after the date that the court issues the order of impoundment or immobilization, the clerk of the court must send notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the registered owner of each vehicle, if the registered owner is a person other than the defendant, and to each person of record claiming a lien against the vehicle.

(e) A person who owns but was not operating the vehicle when the offense occurred may submit to the court a police report indicating that the vehicle was stolen at the time of the offense or documentation of having purchased the vehicle after the offense was committed from an entity other than the defendant or the defendant's agent. If the court finds that the vehicle was stolen or that the sale was not made to circumvent the order and allow the defendant continued access to the vehicle, the order must be dismissed and the owner of the vehicle will incur no costs. If the court denies the request to dismiss the order of impoundment or immobilization, the petitioner may request an evidentiary hearing.

(f) A person who owns but was not operating the vehicle when the offense occurred, and whose vehicle was stolen or who purchased the vehicle after the offense was committed directly from the defendant or the defendant's agent, may request an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the impoundment or immobilization should occur. If the court finds that either the vehicle was stolen or the purchase was made without knowledge of the offense, that the purchaser had no relationship to the defendant other than through the transaction, and that such purchase would not circumvent the order and allow the defendant continued access to the vehicle, the order must be dismissed and the owner of the vehicle will incur no costs.

(g) The court shall also dismiss the order of impoundment or immobilization of the vehicle if the court finds that the family of the owner of the vehicle has no other private or public means of transportation.

(h) The court may also dismiss the order of impoundment or immobilization of any vehicles that are owned by the defendant but that are operated solely by the employees of the defendant or any business owned by the defendant.

(i) All costs and fees for the impoundment or immobilization, including the cost of notification, must be paid by the owner of the vehicle or, if the vehicle is leased or rented, by the person leasing or renting the vehicle, unless the impoundment or immobilization order is dismissed. All provisions of s. 713.78 shall apply.

(j) The person who owns a vehicle that is impounded or immobilized under this paragraph, or a person who has a lien of record against such a vehicle and who has not requested a review of the impoundment pursuant to paragraph (e), paragraph (f), or paragraph (g), may, within 10 days after the date that person has knowledge of the location of the vehicle, file a complaint in the county in which the owner resides to determine whether the vehicle was wrongfully taken or withheld from the owner or lienholder. Upon the filing of a complaint, the owner or lienholder may have the vehicle released by posting with the court a bond or other adequate security equal to the amount of the costs and fees for impoundment or immobilization, including towing or storage, to ensure the payment of such costs and fees if the owner or lienholder does not prevail. When the bond is posted and the fee is paid as set forth in s. 28.24, the clerk of the court shall issue a certificate releasing the vehicle. At the time of release, after reasonable inspection, the owner or lienholder must give a receipt to the towing or storage company indicating any loss or damage to the vehicle or to the contents of the vehicle.

(k) A defendant, in the court's discretion, may be required to serve all or any portion of a term of imprisonment to which the defendant has been sentenced pursuant to this section in a residential alcoholism treatment program or a residential drug abuse treatment program. Any time spent in such a program must be credited by the court toward the term of imprisonment.

For the purposes of this section, any conviction for a violation of s. 327.35; a previous conviction for the violation of former s. 316.1931, former s. 860.01, or former s. 316.028; or a previous conviction outside this state for driving under the influence, driving while intoxicated, driving with an unlawful blood-alcohol level, driving with an unlawful breath-alcohol level, or any other similar alcohol-related or drug-related traffic offense, is also considered a previous conviction for violation of this section.

However, in satisfaction of the fine imposed pursuant to this section, the court may, upon a finding that the defendant is financially unable to pay either all or part of the fine, order that the defendant participate for a specified additional period of time in public service or a community work project in lieu of payment of that portion of the fine which the court determines the defendant is unable to pay. In determining such additional sentence, the court shall consider the amount of the unpaid portion of the fine and the reasonable value of the services to be ordered; however, the court may not compute the reasonable value of services at a rate less than the federal minimum wage at the time of sentencing.

(7) A conviction under this section does not bar any civil suit for damages against the person so convicted.

(8) At the arraignment, or in conjunction with any notice of arraignment provided by the clerk of the court, the clerk shall provide any person charged with a violation of this section with notice that upon conviction the court shall suspend or revoke the offender's driver's license and that the offender should make arrangements for transportation at any proceeding in which the court may take such action. Failure to provide such notice does not affect the court's suspension or revocation of the offender's driver's license.

(9) A person who is arrested for a violation of this section may not be released from custody:

(a) Until the person is no longer under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance controlled under chapter 893 and affected to the extent that his or her normal faculties are impaired;

(b) Until the person's blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level is less than 0.05; or

(c) Until 8 hours have elapsed from the time the person was arrested.

(10) The rulings of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles under s. 322.2615 shall not be considered in any trial for a violation of this section. Testimony or evidence from the administrative proceedings or any written statement submitted by a person in his or her request for administrative review is inadmissible into evidence or for any other purpose in any criminal proceeding, unless timely disclosed in criminal discovery pursuant to Rule 3.220, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.

(11) The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles is directed to adopt rules providing for the implementation of the use of ignition interlock devices.

(12) If the records of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles show that the defendant has been previously convicted of the offense of driving under the influence, that evidence is sufficient by itself to establish that prior conviction for driving under the influence. However, such evidence may be contradicted or rebutted by other evidence. This presumption may be considered along with any other evidence presented in deciding whether the defendant has been previously convicted of the offense of driving under the influence.

History.--s. 1, ch. 71-135; s. 19, ch. 73-331; s. 1, ch. 74-384; s. 1, ch. 76-31; s. 1, ch. 79-408; s. 1, ch. 80-343; s. 2, ch. 82-155; s. 1, ch. 82-403; s. 2, ch. 83-187; s. 1, ch. 83-228; s. 1, ch. 84-359; s. 24, ch. 85-167; s. 2, ch. 85-337; s. 1, ch. 86-296; s. 2, ch. 88-5; s. 5, ch. 88-82; s. 8, ch. 88-196; s. 8, ch. 88-324; s. 60, ch. 88-381; s. 7, ch. 89-3; ss. 1, 18, ch. 91-255; s. 32, ch. 92-78; ss. 1, 11, ch. 93-124; s. 3, ch. 93-246; s. 1, ch. 94-324; s. 895, ch. 95-148; s. 1, ch. 95-186; s. 4, ch. 95-333; s. 12, ch. 95-408; s. 3, ch. 96-330; s. 2, ch. 96-413; s. 48, ch. 97-100; s. 97, ch. 97-264; s. 25, ch. 97-271; ss. 6, 13, ch. 98-324; s. 5, ch. 99-234; s. 139, ch. 99-248; s. 4, ch. 2000-313; s. 10, ch. 2000-320; s. 2, ch. 2002-78; s. 1, ch. 2002-263; s. 1, ch. 2004-379; s. 1, ch. 2005-119.
1Note.--Section 9, ch. 2005-119, provides that "[t]his act shall take effect October 1, 2005, and shall apply to offenses committed on or after that date."

Note.--Former s. 316.028.


316.192 Reckless driving.
(1) Any person who drives any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.

(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), any person convicted of reckless driving shall be punished:

a. Upon a first conviction, by imprisonment for a period of not more than 90 days or by fine of not less than $25 nor more than $500, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

b. On a second or subsequent conviction, by imprisonment for not more than 6 months or by a fine of not less than $50 nor more than $1,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

(3) Any person:

a. Who is in violation of subsection (1);
b. Who operates a vehicle; and
c. Who, by reason of such operation, causes:

1. Damage to the property or person of another commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

2. Serious bodily injury to another commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. The term "serious bodily injury" means an injury to another person, which consists of a physical condition that creates a substantial risk of death, serious personal disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.

(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, $5 shall be added to a fine imposed pursuant to this section. The clerk shall remit the $5 to the Department of Revenue for deposit in the Emergency Medical Services Trust Fund.

(5) In addition to any other penalty provided under this section, if the court has reasonable cause to believe that the use of alcohol, chemical substances set forth in s. 877.111, or substances controlled under chapter 893 contributed to a violation of this section, the court shall direct the person so convicted to complete a DUI program substance abuse education course and evaluation as provided in s. 316.193(5) within a reasonable period of time specified by the court.

If the DUI program conducting such course and evaluation refers the person to an authorized substance abuse treatment provider for substance abuse evaluation and treatment, the directive of the court requiring completion of such course, evaluation, and treatment shall be enforced as provided in s. 322.245. The referral to treatment resulting from the DUI program evaluation may not be waived without a supporting independent psychosocial evaluation conducted by an authorized substance abuse treatment provider, appointed by the court, which shall have access to the DUI program psychosocial evaluation before the independent psychosocial evaluation is conducted. The court shall review the results and recommendations of both evaluations before determining the request for waiver.

The offender shall bear the full cost of this procedure. If a person directed to a DUI program substance abuse education course and evaluation or referred to treatment under this subsection fails to report for or complete such course, evaluation, or treatment, the DUI program shall notify the court and the department of the failure. Upon receipt of such notice, the department shall cancel the person's driving privilege, notwithstanding the terms of the court order or any suspension or revocation of the driving privilege. The department may reinstate the driving privilege upon verification from the DUI program that the education, evaluation, and treatment are completed.

The department may temporarily reinstate the driving privilege on a restricted basis upon verification that the offender is currently participating in treatment and has completed the DUI education course and evaluation requirement. If the DUI program notifies the department of the second failure to complete treatment, the department shall reinstate the driving privilege only after notice of successful completion of treatment from the DUI program.

History.--s. 1, ch. 71-135; s. 1, ch. 76-31; s. 23, ch. 85-167; s. 1, ch. 85-337; s. 1, ch. 88-5; s. 17, ch. 91-255; s. 31, ch. 92-78; s. 10, ch. 94-306; s. 4, ch. 99-234; s. 9, ch. 2001-122; s. 1, ch. 2001-147.
Note.--Former s. 316.029.


316.1925 Careless driving.
(1) Any person operating a vehicle upon the streets or highways within the state shall drive the same in a careful and prudent manner, having regard for the width, grade, curves, corners, traffic, and all other attendant circumstances, so as not to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person. Failure to drive in such manner shall constitute careless driving and a violation of this section.

(2) Any person who violates this section shall be cited for a moving violation, punishable as provided in chapter 318.

History.--s. 1, ch. 71-135; ss. 1, 6, ch. 76-31; s. 24, ch. 96-350.
Note.--Former s. 316.030